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Abstract 
Nuclear energy’s distinctive characteristics give rise to special educational requirements. These 
requirements are necessary to not only address the potential danger of nuclear proliferation, but also to 
build capacity for a secure nuclear fuel circle. In this paper, I assess the status of educational capacity in 
nuclear security both in response to, and in support of, Kenya’s nuclear power program. I highlight the 
nuclear security educational infrastructure’s key features in the context of nuclear power, noting the low 
capacity at Kenyan universities. I identify the steps required to ensure that the country’s dynamic nuclear 
regulatory infrastructural framework is used effectively to build capacity in nuclear security. I then 
examine the link between nuclear security and nuclear forensics and discuss efforts toward developing 
educational capacity in nuclear security through forensics research at the University of Nairobi, 
emphasizing in-field nuclear forensics and management of nuclear and radioactive materials out of 
statutory control. Finally, I consider the research challenges and solutions, which include developing a 
National Nuclear Forensic Library as a database for illicit trafficking or incidents that involve nuclear and 
radioactive material. I conclude that, despite the challenges, progress is underway but can be accelerated 
by promoting broader stakeholder involvement and government buy-in for more comprehensive 
educational capacity building in nuclear security. 
I. Introduction 
A. Nuclear Security in the Context of Kenya’s Nuclear Power 
Program 
i. International Agreements 
Developing a nuclear security infrastructure requires considerable effort, especially for a country new to 
establishing a nuclear power program. In consideration of this, Kenya is a state party to the Convention 
on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and its 2016 Amendment (CPPNM, 1979) [1]. The 
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Convention’s scope encompasses physical protection of nuclear facilities and nuclear material in domestic 
use, storage, and transport. It also criminalizes theft and smuggling of nuclear material and the actual or 
threatened sabotage of nuclear facilities. States are required to minimize any radiological consequences of 
sabotage and prevent and combat related offenses. In this regard, Kenya voluntarily shares incidents 
involving radioactive material on IAEA’s Incident and Trafficking Database (ITDB). Furthermore, by 
2006, Kenya had already become party to the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of 
Nuclear Terrorism [2], the Convention on Nuclear Safety [3], the Convention on Early Notification of a 
Nuclear Accident [4], the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management, and the Safety of 
Radioactive Waste Management [5]. These treaties, among other regulatory and legal provisions, whether 
signed or in progress, demonstrate Kenya’s commitment to securely pursue peaceful uses of atomic 
energy, including nuclear power development. 
ii. Developing Domestic Infrastructure 
Following the National Economic and Social Council’s (NESC) 2010 recommendation that nuclear 
power is the most viable option for meeting the country’s energy needs while reducing carbon emissions 
[6], Kenya incorporated nuclear power into its energy blueprint. Consequently, a nuclear energy 
programme implementing organization (NEPIO), now the Kenya Nuclear Electricity Board (KNEB), 
was established. KNEB’s plans adhere to the IAEA Milestone approach and are currently in Phase 1 [7]. 
In the context of nuclear security, Kenya has established—via the radiation safety and protection 
regulatory agency (the Radiation Protection Board [RPB])—the national Nuclear Security Coordination 
Centre (NSCC), which brings together eighteen state stakeholders in nuclear energy. NSCC’s overall 
objective is to promote a high level of nuclear security training and support services. The Integrated 
Nuclear Security Support Plan (INSSP) was recently finalized and provides a regular summary of the 
country’s activities toward enhancing nuclear security. 
B. Nuclear Security and Nuclear Power 
Although a country could establish some degree of nuclear security knowledge without a nuclear power 
program—for example, by promoting international non-proliferation comprehensive nuclear security 
education expertise, which enables a country to more holistically manage all nuclear security issues—
nuclear security expertise is best developed in the context of a nuclear power program. Approximately 
fifty countries have attempted to develop nuclear power, but the only ones that succeeded had some 
degree of expertise in nuclear security and were already engaged in building a reactor. These successful 
countries include Argentina, Mexico, Pakistan, South Korea, and Yugoslavia [8]. However, lack of 
educational capacity in nuclear security was the key impediment to the countries that failed to develop 
nuclear power [9]. Turkey, for instance, had plans to establish nuclear power as early as 1970. But 
it was not until the Triga research reactor at Istanbul Technical University was built in 1979 (the same 
year that Turkey ratified the 1970 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons [NPT] [10] and 
Additional Protocol [1981–2001]) [11] that its nuclear power program accelerated. An effective national 
nuclear security infrastructure ensures that nuclear and radioactive materials do not fall into the hands of 
parties who could use them for criminal or terrorist acts and prevents acts of sabotage against facilities 
and associated activities, even when in transit [12]. In order to ensure such security, educational capacity 
in nuclear security must be an essential part of a nuclear power program [13]. This paper assesses 
Kenya’s status and development of educational capacity in nuclear security, with focus on demonstrating 
how it is both responding poorly to the country’s new nuclear power program, while simultaneously 
providing the impetus for, among other similar stakeholder activities, the University of Nairobi to remedy 
the situation. 
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II. Framework for Capacity Building in Nuclear Security 
A. Nuclear Security Training 
In 2009, the IAEA recognized the need to establish and develop human resources for nuclear security in 
member states. Overseeing capacity building and human resource development to support the nuclear 
power program roadmap is among KNEB’s mandates [14]. In collaboration with the IAEA, Kenya has 
hosted national and regional nuclear security training courses for border and other security personnel to 
improve illicitly-trafficked radioactive and nuclear material detection capability. IAEA has provided 
radiation-detection equipment support toward this initiative. In the context of IAEA’s Emergency 
Preparedness and Review Mission to the country in 2015 [15], Kenya developed a National Nuclear and 
Radiological Emergency Preparedness and Response Action Plan. 
 
In terms of domestic capacity building in nuclear security, these efforts translate merely to basic skills in 
responding to nuclear and radiological emergencies. Nuclear security is a much broader discipline that 
relates to the prevention and detection of, and response to, theft, sabotage, unauthorized access and illegal 
transfer, or other malicious acts involving nuclear material, other radioactive substances, and their 
associated facilities [12]. In this context, the alarmingly scant educational capacity in nuclear security at 
Kenyan universities is easily noticeable. 
B. Nuclear Security Education 
None of Kenya’s thirty-one universities with public charter currently have a nuclear security educational 
program. Before the advent of the country’s nuclear power program, only Kenyatta University and the 
University of Nairobi (the country’s oldest and largest university) had graduate programs in Applied 
Nuclear and Radiation Physics [16]. These graduate programs build on the normal, basic undergraduate 
Atomic and Nuclear Physics courses, and none offer Nuclear Chemistry or Radiochemistry. The 
University of Nairobi’s Institute of Nuclear Science and Technology’s 1979 mandate to train human 
resources in the multidisciplinary applications of nuclear science techniques is limited and, nearly forty 
years later, produces only a handful of graduate students (about five every year since its inception). No 
Kenyan university has a program in nuclear engineering. Furthermore, nuclear energy topics are 
noticeably absent in Law, Engineering, Economics, and other related courses. Considering the 
interdisciplinary characteristics of nuclear security, this narrowness contributes significantly to Kenya’s 
educational capacity building problems. 
 
Several IAEA conferences have highlighted nuclear security’s need for human resource development 
programs. These include IAEA’s International Conference on Human Resource Development for 
Introducing and Expanding Nuclear Power Programmes, held in Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates, 14-18 
March 2010; and the International Conference on Human Resource Development for Nuclear Power 
Programmes: Building and Sustaining Capacity (Strategies for Education and Training, Networking and 
Knowledge Management), held in Vienna, Austria, 12–16 May 2014. Successive IAEA Nuclear Security 
Plans give high priority to assisting states in establishing nuclear security educational programs. The 
current Nuclear Security Plan for 2010-2013 [17] emphasizes the importance of considering existing 
capacities at international, regional, and national levels when designing nuclear security academic 
programs. As the responsibility of nuclear security rests wholly within each state, member states need 
educational infrastructure development strategies. This is best accomplished through a friendly 
partnership among university, industry, and government organizations that recognize the 
interdisciplinarity of nuclear energy. The goal of this collaboration should be to create, develop, and 
promote career pathways by adapting the existing programs to nuclear security needs. For this purpose, 
gap analysis and needs assessment are crucial. This study employs these methods to bridge the gap in a 
twofold way: (i) by pursuing generic capacity building in nuclear sciences to support government 
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organizations in making knowledgeable nuclear power-related decisions; and (ii) by developing technical 
nuclear forensics professionals to help implement nuclear security. 
i. Nuclear Forensics in Support of Nuclear Security 
Nuclear forensics is the examination of nuclear or other radioactive materials, or of evidence that is 
contaminated with radionuclides, in the context of legal proceedings. Nuclear forensics can be utilized not 
only for a post-event investigation, but also for prevention of nuclear security events. For example, 
nuclear forensics can help identify previously unknown nuclear security gaps at both the facilities level 
and the state level, thus pointing out the existence of unaddressed deficiencies in materials accounting, 
control, and physical protection as well as highlighting the existent needs to improve a country’s nuclear 
security regime [18]. In the case of an explosion, nuclear forensics can reconstruct key features of the 
nuclear device and can help identify its origins. Through rapid characterization of nuclear materials, 
nuclear forensics is thus a deterrent in itself against nuclear security threats, such as illicit trafficking and 
danger of terrorism utilizing improvised nuclear devices and/or radiological dispersal devices. 
 
For these reasons, nuclear forensics is an essential component of the IAEA nuclear security program, in 
direct relation to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM) [1]. Such 
essentiality is due to nuclear forensics’ role in enabling cooperation and assistance in the event, or 
credible threat, of theft, robbery, or any other unlawful taking of nuclear material. Its involvement is 
geared toward the recovery of unlawfully taken nuclear material, the prosecution or extradition of alleged 
offenders, and the provision of assistance by member states in connection with criminal proceedings. 
CPPNM’s scope extends to nuclear facilities and material in domestic use, storage, and transport. As 
such, nuclear forensics plays a role in the expanded cooperation among states, enabling rapid measures to 
locate and recover stolen or smuggled nuclear material, mitigate any radiological consequences of 
sabotage, and prevent and combat related offenses. Nuclear forensics also contributes to the Convention 
by assisting in the establishment of new nuclear smuggling, illicit trafficking, and sabotage offenses, as 
well as acts directly contributing to the commission of such offenses. These contributions are in line with 
the UN Security Council resolution 1373 and 1540 adopted under Chapter VII of the UN Charter in 2004 
[19] and as such, states are obligated to adopt and enforce these measures and offenses. 
III. Toward Nuclear Security Education at the University 
of Nairobi 
Presently, Kenya’s highest priority is developing measures to detect, deter, prevent, and combat illicit 
trafficking in nuclear and related (i.e., radioactive and radiological) materials. At the division of Applied 
Nuclear and Radiation Physics in the University of Nairobi’s Department of Physics, we have responded 
to this by infusing our graduate academic courses with a technical focus (as opposed to policy focus) in 
nuclear security. Our strategy aligns closely with the ongoing establishment of a sustainable regulatory 
framework for the country’s nuclear power program. Due to lack of qualified staff and requisite 
experimental facilities, it is not currently feasible to launch a full-fledged MSc Nuclear Security course, 
according to IAEA Nuclear Security Series No. 12 guidelines [20]. However, we have developed a new 
program that reforms the original one, which consisted of eight 40-hour courses in the first of two years 
[21]. In the previous program, during the first semester of year one, students took Advanced Nuclear 
Physics plus any three fundamental courses in advanced physics, such as Quantum Mechanics or 
Statistical Physics. In the second semester, students selected another four courses from among the 
following: Advanced Laboratory Techniques, Radiation Physics, Radiation Measurement and 
Spectroscopy, Radiation Protection and Dosimetry, and Applications of Radiation. In the second year of 
study, students began supervised thesis research on a relevant topic and received credits equivalent to 
eight taught courses. 
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A. New Course Structure 
The new program, targeting young graduates from engineering and natural sciences backgrounds, is 
composed of ten courses in year one, instead of the previous eight. In the first semester, Advanced 
Nuclear Physics is retained (but appropriately revised) and is taken along with another four fundamental 
courses, one of which is required to be Reactor Theory. The second semester’s courses are categorized in 
five tracks, namely Nuclear Security and Safeguards, Health Physics and Radioprotection, Applied 
Radiometrics, Nuclear Science Techniques, and Applied Nuclear Physics. 
 
Below are the details of the Nuclear Security and Safeguards track. The percentages shown in the 
parenthesis indicate how much IAEA Nuclear Security Series modules content is incorporated into the 
course. For instance, Nuclear Forensics and Attribution borrowed fully from NS 19 [22], Methods and 
Instruments for Nuclear & Radioactive Material Measurements from NS 4 [23], Threat Assessment from 
NS 6 [24], and Nuclear and Radioactive Material Accountancy and Inventory Control from NS 13 [25]. 
 
During the second semester of year one, students in the Nuclear Security and Safeguards track will take 
PHY-2, PHY-3, and PHY-7 plus any other two courses (following guidance) from the list below. 
 
PHY-1: Nuclear Energy and Nuclear Fuel Circle (85% from NS 3) 
PHY-2: Fundamentals of Nuclear Security (75% from NS 1) 
PHY-3: Nuclear Forensics and Attribution (NS 19) 
PHY-4: Crime Scene Investigation and Forensic Techniques (NS 12) 
PHY-5: Threat Assessment (NS 6) 
PHY-6: Methods and Instruments for Nuclear & Radioactive Material Measurements (NS 4) 
PHY-7: Nuclear and Radioactive Material Accountancy & Inventory Control (NS 13) 
PHY-8: Fundamentals of Nuclear Energy Management 
 
The thesis research pursued in the second year will focus on the student’s track, but emphasize our current 
research strengths: 
 
(i) Nuclear forensics and attribution methodologies in support of nuclear security  
(ii) Analysis and modeling of nuclear traces and dynamics in complex ecosystems  
(iii) Size-resolved radiogenic characterization of atmospheric aerosols and hot particles 
 
The above courses are also intended to enrich our recently developed undergraduate-level Nuclear, 
Radiation & Health Physics track, where we have tailored experiments focusing on modern microscopy, 
fundamentals of image formation with applications in nuclear sciences, detector electronics and digital 
signal and image processing. Furthermore, our course development recently assisted the University of 
Nairobi’s School of Medicine in starting their MSc Forensic Science program. We suggested and 
developed two 20-hour course modules in their new curriculum, namely Elements of Nuclear Security 
and Nuclear Forensic Radioanalytics. 
 
Ideally, the new program will both motivate and prepare students for careers in nuclear security. The new 
course recognizes the interdisciplinary dimensions of nuclear security and adapts the existing program to 
the emerging needs of the nuclear power program. The promotion of safeguards, safety, and a security 
culture are integral to the program. However, challenges continue to exist in designing a proper 
curriculum and identifying appropriate teaching and assessment methods to promote student learning in 
this exciting area [26]. Examples of the challenges include a lack of qualified staff to sustain a graduate 
program which can be accredited and which favorably benchmarks with similar programs in nuclear 
security elsewhere; the narrowed breadth of the program to fit into our nascent research line in nuclear 
forensics; and the initial restriction of the program to mostly physics (and related) graduate students, 
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given the interdisciplinary character of nuclear security. However, these challenges are expected to reduce 
as the program matures and generates enough graduates versed in nuclear security to become faculty, and 
as research capacity in nuclear security expands beyond nuclear forensics. Furthermore, the gradual 
maturing of Kenya’s nuclear power program will compel infrastructural development in nuclear security, 
thus providing a partner, as well as stakeholder, to our educational efforts. 
B. Nuclear Forensics as a Nuclear Security Education Tool 
The Nuclear Security and Safeguards track is strongly supported by a relatively new research line in 
nuclear forensics. We consider nuclear forensics research as a means to both foster scientific innovation 
in nuclear security and to support non-proliferation by enabling the identification of high-confidence 
nuclear forensic signatures. The research aims to support the nuclear security infrastructure necessary for 
the country’s safe handling of nuclear materials and to promote its nuclear power program. Building a 
nuclear forensics workforce requires a scientific education primarily in physics or chemistry with 
specialization in radiochemistry, health physics, nuclear physics, etc., followed by hands-on experience 
working with nuclear material and analytical techniques. Our research group is composed of three faculty, 
one PhD student, and five MSc students from various backgrounds (physics, chemistry, and nuclear 
science). 
 
Nuclear forensics—normally pursued to support criminal investigation of illegal use, transfer, or disposal 
of nuclear and radioactive materials—probes the relationship between the materials’ origin and intended 
use [27]. Thus, nuclear forensics is a useful tool in the nuclear fuel cycle. The nuclear forensic signatures 
of interest include isotopic (U, Pu, Th, Co, O, Pb, Sr, Nd, S) chemical (compound, rare-earth element 
patterns, trace metal, ionic) impurities as well as microstructural information on the materials. As 
materials move through the nuclear fuel cycle, these nuclear forensic signatures are created, modified, and 
destroyed; therefore, each step provides information that can be used to constrain the source [28]. In our 
research, we emphasize the science behind the detection and attribution of the materials. As trace 
evidence and microanalysis are ubiquitous in nuclear forensics, we have developed multimodal, machine-
learning-enabled nuclear forensic analytical and imaging spectrometry methodologies for this purpose, 
utilizing chemical (metal, molecular), isotopic, and structural signatures of the analyzed nuclear and 
radioactive materials to support national nuclear security concerns. 
 
Advances in photonics, especially in optics and imaging spectrometry that enable material analysis at 
microscale resolution, enable the development of such rapid nuclear forensic analysis methods. As a 
result of the nuclear renaissance, nuclear proliferation is a growing danger that is further complicated by 
possibilities of terrorism through the utilization of improvised nuclear devices and/or radiological 
dispersal devices. Such risk places a critical challenge on the existing nuclear forensics analysis methods, 
which are usually radiochemical or radiometric and costly, to cope with tasks that demand rapid, direct, 
and minimally invasive characterization of nuclear and radioactive materials, especially if they are of 
limited size and/or concealed. This underscores the need to develop new methods and improve on the 
existing ones, for nuclear materials and post-detonation debris analysis. Analytical capability for micro-
size samples is an especially powerful tool for monitoring undeclared nuclear activity, verifying nuclear 
safeguards, responding to nuclear anthropogenic releases, and analyzing materials from radiological 
crime scenes. For these purposes, we employ X-ray fluorescence spectroscopy, laser-scanning 
microscopy, laser Raman microspectrometry, and laser-induced breakdown/ablation molecular isotopic 
spectroscopy (LIBS/LAMIS) [29–31]. 
 
While the advantage of combining the above techniques is clear, the interpretive challenges of high-
dimensional data [32] complicate the identity and distribution of nuclear forensic signatures. 
Incorporating machine learning broadens the techniques’ applicability by enabling mining (management, 
analysis, and visualization of large data sets) and extraction of useful information embedded in the spectra 
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as well as images that are acquired from the instruments while providing greater versatility. For instance, 
genetic algorithms hybridize deductive models and evolve predictive rules applicable to nuclear forensics 
attribution, revealing unexpected information. Machine learning further enables amplified analytical 
sensitivity. The major advantage of machine learning is its ability to represent multivariate data into few 
dimensions in a graphical interface [33, 34], allowing us to use data fusion to derive robust forensic 
attributions. Our research results are the first systematic nuclear forensics data in the country and will 
help guide the development of a national nuclear forensic library (NNFL). An NNFL is an essential 
facility for any country with a nuclear power program and, in Kenya, will bolster response capability to 
nuclear security events through a broad spectrum of signatures and methods that contribute to nuclear 
non-proliferation. 
C. Leveraging International Partnerships 
Forging international links is key to creating a global, nuclear-secure regime. Since 2013, when the 
University of Nairobi became a member, the activities of the International Nuclear Security Network 
(INSEN) [35] have been an important catalyst for our efforts. INSEN’s mission is to enhance global 
nuclear security by developing, sharing, and promoting excellence in nuclear security education. In line 
with its mission, INSEN assisted in the development of the previously-mentioned new courses at the 
University of Nairobi via production of teaching materials, professional development opportunities for 
faculty, and global networking of staff [36]. Further international cooperation includes the International 
Science Program’s (ISP) support of our nuclear forensics research line. ISP assists lower-income 
countries in building and strengthening their domestic research capacity and postgraduate education in the 
basic sciences. ISP funded the purchase of our key research equipment through the grant “Advancing 
Integrated Machine Learning Enabled Microphotonic Approaches to Multifunctional Disease Diagnostics 
and Nuclear Forensic Analysis (2017-19).” Our efforts in the nuclear forensics research group have also 
been supported by The World Academy of Sciences (TWAS) for the Advancement of Science in 
Developing Countries, which supports sustainable prosperity through research, education, policy, and 
diplomacy [37]. In this context, TWAS helped three MSc students pursue research in nuclear forensics at 
our research group under the grant “Development of Machine Learning Enabled Laser Based 
Spectrometry and Imaging Approaches for Direct Rapid Nuclear Forensics Analysis and Attribution 
(2014-16).” 
 
These collaborative efforts and bilateral agreements align with Kenya’s commitment to pursue its nuclear 
power program through international involvement. As such, Kenya has received IAEA support with two 
national technical cooperation projects in energy planning and for 49 fellowships in nuclear energy 
fundamentals since 2012. IAEA has especially supported Kenya’s quest to foster international 
partnerships in the development of indigenous capacity, such as the annual training programs created by 
Texas A&M University’s Nuclear Power Institute. Since 2012, these programs, developed in cooperation 
with the IAEA, have offered supportive training in Nuclear Power Plant Technology. 
 
In the same context, Kenya has signed several memorandums of understanding (MoU) with established 
nuclear power countries, namely Slovakia, China, Republic of Korea, and Russia. These MoUs aim at 
enhancing collaboration in the development of Kenya’s nuclear power program. Consequently, more than 
400 Kenyans have benefited from trainings, fellowships, scientific visits, and technical meetings related 
to nuclear power, and also through the Masters in Nuclear Engineering at the Kepco International Nuclear 
Graduate School (KINGS) in the Republic of Korea. 
 
The progress of Kenya’s collaborative efforts in the development of nuclear power depends on the 
endorsement of an Act of Parliament on peaceful uses of atomic energy. This Act should be followed by 
the creation of a Nuclear Energy Corporation for planning, designing, constructing, operating, 
maintaining, and managing nuclear power plants. Furthermore, there is a need to create a Nuclear 
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Regulatory Authority with responsibility for safety, security, and safeguards. KNEB has already 
established an Inter-Ministerial Working Group, which—under the guidance of IAEA—has developed a 
Draft National Nuclear Regulatory Bill (2015) and Nuclear Policy [38], providing optimism for the 
future. 
IV. Conclusion and Prospects 
This paper has assessed the status of education capacity in nuclear security both in response to, and in 
support of, Kenya’s nuclear power program. The nuclear security educational infrastructure’s key features 
have been highlighted in the context of nuclear power. The low levels of nuclear security educational 
capacity at Kenyan universities have been recognized and appropriate strategies identified for remedying 
the situation, namely the current effort at the University of Nairobi toward developing educational 
capacity in nuclear security and research in nuclear forensics. The link between nuclear forensics and 
nuclear security has been examined in detail. It has been argued that the multimodal photonic 
microanalytical approach to nuclear forensics research is enabling the identification of a comprehensive 
combination of nuclear forensic signatures to manage nuclear materials out of statutory control. However, 
more rapid progress will require stronger involvement of stakeholder networks extending to all sectors of 
the nuclear fuel cycle. I propose a National Working Group on Education and Knowledge Management in 
Nuclear Security in Kenya to identify a course of action and the steps required to ensure effective use of 
the country’s infrastructure for nuclear security education. In this regard, the Kenya Nuclear Electricity 
Board should serve as a think tank to bring all stakeholders together to discuss the plans. KNEB is the 
promoter of the country’s nuclear power program and therefore it must fulfill its role in increasing and 
sustaining political buy-in and government investment in nuclear security initiatives. This will improve 
national capacity to build a nuclear power plant earlier than projected. 
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